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Abstract. We consider a framework in which a group of agents com-
municates by means of emails, with the possibility of replies, forwards
and blind carbon copies (BCC). We study the epistemic consequences of
such email exchanges by introducing an appropriate epistemic language
and semantics. Then we clarify when a group of agents acquires common
knowledge of the formula expressing that an email was sent.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Email is by now a prevalent form of communication. Its advantages speak for
themselves. However, we rarely pause to reflect on its undesired consequences.
Just to mention a few.
One occasionally reads about scandals caused by email leaks, see, e.g., [2].
On a smaller scale, users of the blind carbon copy feature (BCC) are sometimes
confronted with an undesired situation in which a BCC recipient of an email
reveals his status to others by using the reply-all feature.
Recently, a main Dutch daily, NRC Handelsblad, reported, see [7], that
Wouter Bos, the Deputy Prime minister in the previous Dutch government,
revealed the extensive network of his contacts by sending out his new email ad-
dress to hundreds of influential recipients whose email addresses were erronously
put in the CC list instead of the BCC list. The list was leaked to the newspaper.
So when studying email exchanges a natural question arises: what are their
knowledge-theoretic consequences? To put it more informally: after an email
exchange took place, who knows what? To answer this question we study email
exchanges by focusing on relevant features that we encounter in most email
systems.
More specifically, we study the following form of email communication:
– each email has a sender, a non-empty set of regular recipients and a (possibly
empty) set of blind carbon copy (BCC) recipients. Each of the recipients
receives a copy of the message and is only aware of the regular recipients
and not of the BCC recipients,
– in the case of a reply to or a forward of a message, the unaltered original
message is included,
– in a reply or a forward, one can append new information to the original
message one replies to or forwards.
As a result, the email exchanges, as studied here, are essentially different from
other forms of communication, in particular from multicasting, i.e., sending a
message to a group of recipients. Also, the resulting model of email communica-
tion differs from the ones that were studied in other papers in which only limited
aspects of emails have been considered. These papers are discussed below.
1.2 Related work
The study of the epistemic effects of communication in distributed systems orig-
inated in the eighties and led to the seminal book [5]. The relevant literature,
including [4], deals only with the customary form of communication, notably
asynchronous send.
The epistemic effects of other forms of communication were studied in numer-
ous papers. In particular, in [9] the communicative acts are assumed to consist
of an agent j ‘reading’ an arbitrary propositional formula from another agent i.
The idea of an epistemic contents of an email is implicitly present in [10], where a
formal model is proposed that formalizes how communication changes the knowl-
edge of a recipient of the message. In [3] a dynamic epistemic logic modelling
effects of communication and change is introduced and extensively studied. [8]
surveys these and related approaches and discusses the used epistemic, dynamic
epistemic and doxastic logics. Further, in [12] an epistemic logic was proposed
to reason about information flow w.r.t. underlying communication channels.
Most related to the work here reported are the following two references. [1]
studied knowledge and common knowledge in a set up in which the agents send
and forward propositional formulas in a social network. However, the forward
did not include the original message which limited the scope of the resulting
analysis. More recently, in [11] explicit messages are introduced in a dynamic
epistemic logic to analyze a very similar setting, though it is assumed that the
number of messages is finite and BCC is simulated as discussed in Section 6.
Finally, the concept of a causal relation between messages in distributed
systems is due to [6].
1.3 Contributions
To study the relevant features of email communication we introduce in the next
section a carefully chosen set of emails. We make a distinction between amessage,
which is sent to a public recipient list, and an email, which consists of a message
and a set of BCC recipients. This distinction is relevant because a forward email
contains only a message, without the list of BCC recipients. We also introduce
the notion of a legal state that captures the fact that there is a causal ordering
on the emails. For example, an email needs to precede any forward of it.
To reason about the knowledge of the agents after an email exchange has
taken place we introduce in Section 3 an appropriate epistemic language. Its
semantics takes into account the uncertainty of the recipients of an email about
its set of BCC recipients and the ignorance about the existence of emails that
one neither sent nor received. This semantics allows us to evaluate epistemic
formulas in legal states, in particular the formulas that characterize the full
knowledge-theoretic effect of an email.
In Section 4 we present the main result of the paper, that clarifies when a
group of agents can acquire common knowledge of the formula expressing the
fact that an email has been sent. This characterization in particular sheds light
on the epistemic consequences of BCC. The proof this result is given in Section
5. Then in Section 6 we show how BCC can be simulated using only messages
without BCC recipients.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Messages
In this section we define the notion of a message. We assume non-empty and
finite sets of agents Ag = {1, . . ., n} and of notes P . Each agent has a set of
notes he knows initially.
We make a number of assumptions. Firstly, we assume that the agents do not
know which notes belong to the other agents. Furthermore, we assume that the
agents only exchange emails about the notes. In particular, they cannot com-
municate epistemic formulas. We also assume that an agent can send a message
to other agents containing a note only if he knows it initially or has learned it
through an email he received earlier.
We inductively define messages as follows, where in each case we assume
that G 6= ∅:
– m := s(i, l, G); the message containing note l, sent by agent i to the group
G,
– m := f(i, l.m′, G); the forwarding by agent i of the message m′ with added
note l, sent to the group G.
So the agents can send a message with a note or forward a message with a
note appended. In the examples we assume that there exists a note true that is
known by all agents and we identify true.m with m.
If m is a message, then we denote by S(m) and R(m), respectively, the
singleton set consisting of the agent sending m and the group of agents receiving
m. So for the above messages m we have S(m) = {i} and R(m) = G. We do
allow that S(m) ⊆ R(m), i.e., that one sends a message to oneself.
Special forms of the forward messages can be used to model reply messages.
Given f(i, l.m,G), using G = S(m) we obtain the customary reply message and
using G = S(m) ∪ R(m) we obtain the customary reply-all message. (In the
customary email systems there is syntactic difference between a forward and a
reply to these two groups of agents, but the effect of both messages is exactly
the same, so we ignore this difference.) In the examples we write s(i, l, j) instead
of s(i, l, {j}), etc.
2.2 Emails
An interesting feature of most email systems is that of the blind carbon copy
(BCC). We would like to study the epistemic effects of sending an email with
BCC recipients and will now include this feature in our presentation.
In the previous subsection we defined messages that have a sender and a
group of recipients. Now we define the notion of an email which allows the
additional possibility of sending a BCC of a message. The BCC recipients are
not listed in the list of recipients, therefore we have not included them in the
definition of a message. Formally, by an email we mean a construct of the form
mB, wherem is a message and B ⊆Ag is a possibly empty set of BCC recipients.
Given a message m we call each email mB a full version of m.
Since the set of BCC recipients is ‘secret’, it does not appear in a forward.
That is, the forward of an emailmB with added note l is the message f(i, l.m,G)
or an email f(i, l.m,G)C , in which B is not mentioned. However, this forward
may be sent not only by a sender or a regular recipient of mB, but also by a
BCC recipient. Clearly, the fact that an agent was a BCC recipient of an email
is revealed at the moment he forwards its message.
A natural question arises: what if someone is both a regular recipient and a
BCC recipient of an email? In this case, no one (not even this BCC recipient
himself) would ever notice that this recipient was also a BCC recipient since
everyone can explain his knowledge of the message by the fact that he was a
regular recipient. Only the sender of the message would know that this agent
was also a BCC recipient. This fact does not change anything and hence we
assume that for any email mB we have (S(m) ∪R(m)) ∩B = ∅.
2.3 Legal States
Our goal is to analyze knowledge of agents after some email exchange took place.
To this end we need to define a possible collection of sent emails.
First of all, we shall assume that every message is used only once. In other
words, for each message m there is at most one full version of m, i.e., an email
of the form mB. The rationale behind this decision is that a sender of mB and
mB′ might equally well send a single email mB∪B′ . This assumption can be
summarized as a statement that the agents do not have ‘second thoughts’ about
the recipients of their emails. It also simplifies subsequent considerations.
One could argue that there is a total ordering on the emails entailed by the
time at which they were sent. However, the fact that an email was sent at a
certain time does not imply that it was also read at that time. All what we can
assert it that the email was read after it was sent. Further, the order in which
an agent reads the emails he received is undetermined. This explains why we do
not impose a linear ordering on the emails and we do not give the messages time
stamps.
However, we have to impose some ordering on the sets of emails. For example,
we need to make sure that the agents only send information they actually know.
Moreover, a forward can only be sent after the original email was sent. We will
introduce the minimal partial ordering that takes care of such issues.
First, we define by structural induction the factual information FI(m)
contained in a message m as follows:
FI(s(i, l, G)) := {l},
F I(f(i, l.m,G)) := FI(m) ∪ {l}.
We will use the concept of a state to model the effect of an email exchange.
A state s = (E,L) is a tuple consisting of a finite set E of emails that took
place and a sequence L = (L1, . . . , Ln) of sets of notes for all agents. The idea
of these sets is that each agent i initially knows the notes in Li. We use Es and
Ls to denote the corresponding elements of a state s, and L1, . . ., Ln to denote
the elements of L.
We say that a state s = (E,L) is legal w.r.t. a strict partial ordering (in
short, an spo) ≺ on E if it satisfies the following conditions:
L.1: for each email f(i, l.m,G)B ∈ E an email mC ∈ E exists such that mC ≺
f(i, l.m,G)B and i ∈ S(m) ∪R(m) ∪C,
L.2: for each email s(i, l, G)B ∈ E, where l 6∈ Li, an email mC ∈ E exists such
that mC ≺ s(i, l, G)B, i ∈ R(m) ∪C and l ∈ FI(m),
L.3: for each email f(i, l.m′, G)B ∈ E, where l 6∈ Li, an email mC ∈ E exists
such that mC ≺ f(i, l.m′, G)B, i ∈ R(m′) ∪ C and l ∈ FI(m′).
Condition L.1 states that the agents can only forward messages they previ-
ously received. Conditions L.2 and L.3 state that if an agent sends, a note that
he did not initially know, then he must have learned it by means of an earlier
email.
We say that a state s is legal iff it is legal w.r.t. some spo. Given a legal state
s, by its causality ordering we mean the smallest (so the least constraining)
spo w.r.t. which s is legal.
So a state is legal if every forward was preceded by its original message, and
for every note sent in an email there is an explanation how the sender of the
email learned this note.
3 Epistemic language and its semantics
We want to reason about the knowledge of the agents after an email exchange
has taken place. For this purpose we use a language L of communication and
knowledge defined as follows:
ϕ ::= m | i J m | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | CGϕ
The formula m expresses the fact that m has been sent in the past, with
some unknown group of BCC recipients. The formula i J m expresses the fact
that agent i was involved in a full version of the message m, i.e., he was either
the sender, a recipient or a BCC recipient. The formula CGϕ denotes common
knowledge of the formula ϕ in the group G.
We use the usual abbreviations ∨,→ and ↔ and we use Kiϕ as an abbrevi-
ation of C{i}ϕ. The fact that an email with a certain set of BCC recipients was
sent can be expressed in our language by the following abbreviation:
mB ::= m ∧
∧
i∈S(m)∪R(m)∪B
i J m ∧
∧
i6∈S(m)∪R(m)∪B
¬i J m
Note that this formula expresses the fact that the message m was sent with
exactly the group B as BCC recipients, which captures precisely the intended
meaning of mB.
We now provide a semantics for this language interpreted on legal states,
inspired by the epistemic logic and the history-based approaches of [9] and [10].
For every agent i we define an indistinguishability relation ∼i, where we intend
s ∼i s′ to mean that agent i cannot distinguish between the states s and s′. We
first define this relation on the level of emails as follows (recall that we assume
that senders and regular recipients are not BCC recipients):
mB ∼i m′B′
iff one of the following contingencies holds:
(i) i ∈ S(m), m = m′ and B = B′,
(ii) i ∈ R(m) \ S(m) and m = m′,
(iii) i ∈ B ∩B′, and m = m′,
(iv) i 6∈ S(m) ∪R(m) ∪B and i 6∈ S(m′) ∪R(m′) ∪B′.
Condition (i) states that the sender of an email confuses it only with the email
itself. In turn, condition (ii) states that each regular recipient of an email who is
not a sender confuses it with any email with the same message but possibly sent
to a different BCC group. Next, condition (iii) states that each BCC recipient of
an email confuses it with any email with the same message but sent to a possibly
different BCC group of which he is also a member. Finally, condition (iv) states
that each agent confuses any two emails in which he is not involved.
As an example consider the emails e := s(i, l, j)∅ and e
′ := s(i, l, j){k}. We
have then e 6∼i e′, e ∼j e′ and e 6∼k e′. Intuitively, agent j cannot distinguish
between these two emails because he cannot see whether k is a BCC recipient.
In contrast, agents i and k can distinguish between these two emails.
Next, we extend the indistinguishability relation to legal states by defining
(E,L) ∼i (E′, L′)
iff the following holds:
– Li = L
′
i,
– for any mB ∈ E such that i ∈ S(m)∪R(m)∪B there is mB′ ∈ E′ such that
mB ∼i mB′ ,
– for any mB′ ∈ E′ such that i ∈ S(m) ∪ R(m) ∪ B′ there is mB ∈ E such
that mB ∼i mB′ .
So two states cannot be distinguished by agent i if they agree on his notes
and their email sets look the same to him. Since we assume that the agents do
not know anything about the other notes, we do not refer to the sets of notes of
the other agents. Note that ∼i is an equivalence relation.
As an example consider the legal states s1 and s2 which are identical apart
from their sets of emails:
Es1 := {s(i, l, j)∅, f(j, s(i, l, j), o)∅},
Es2 := {s(i, l, j){k}, f(j, s(i, l, j), o)∅, f(k, s(i, l, j), o)∅}.
We assume here that l ∈ Li. The corresponding causality orderings clarify
that in the first state agent i sends a message with note l to agent j and then j
forwards this message to agent o. Further, in the second state agent i sends the
same message but with a BCC to agent k, and then both agent j and agent k
forward the message to agent o.
From the above definition it follows that s1 6∼i s2, s1 ∼j s2, s1 6∼k s2
and s1 6∼o s2. For example, the first claim holds because, as noticed above,
s(i, l, j)∅ 6∼i s(i, l, j){k}. Intuitively, in state s1 agent i is aware that he sent a
BCC to nobody, while in state s2 he is aware that he sent a BCC to agent k.
In order to express common knowledge, we define for a group of agents G
the relation ∼G as the reflexive, transitive closure of
⋃
i∈G ∼i. Then we define
the truth of a formula from our language in a state inductively as follows, where
s = (E,L):
s |= m iff ∃B : mB ∈ E
s |= i J m iff ∃B : mB ∈ E and i ∈ S(m) ∪R(m) ∪B
s |= ¬ϕ iff s 6|= ϕ
s |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff s |= ϕ and s |= ψ
s |= CGϕ iff s′ |= ϕ for any legal state s′ such that s ∼G s′
We say that ϕ is valid (and often just write ‘ϕ’ instead of ‘ϕ is valid’) if for
all legal states s, s |= ϕ.
The following lemma clarifies when specific formulas are valid. In the sequel
we shall use these observations implicitly.
Lemma 1.
(i) m→ m′ is valid iff m = m′ or m′ is part of the message m.
(ii) m → i J m′ is valid iff i ∈ S(m′) ∪ R(m′) or for some note l and group
G, f(i, l.m′, G) is part of the message m.
The second item states that m → i J m′ is valid either if i is a sender
or a receiver of m′ (in that case actually i J m′ is valid) or i forwarded the
message m′. The latter is also possible if i was a BCC receiver of m′. The
claimed equivalence holds thanks to condition L.1.
To illustrate this definition let us return to the above example. In state s2
agent j does not know that agent k received the message s(i, l, j) since he cannot
distinguish s2 from the state s1 in which agent k did not receive this message.
So s2 |= ¬Kjk J s(i, l, j) holds.
On the other hand, in every legal state s3 such that s2 ∼o s3 both an
email f(k, s(i, l, j), o)C and a ‘justifying’ email s(i, l, j)B have to exist such that
s(i, l, j)B ≺ f(k, s(i, l, j), o)C and k ∈ B. Consequently s3 |= k J s(i, l, j), so
s2 |= Kok J s(i, l, j) holds, so by sending the forward agent k revealed himself
to o as a BCC recipient.
We leave to the reader checking that both s2 |= C{k,o}k J s(i, l, j) and s2 |=
¬C{j,o}k J s(i, l, j) holds. In words, agents k and o have common knowledge
that agent k was involved in a full version of the message s(i, l, j), while the
agents j and o don’t.
4 Common knowledge
We now clarify when a group of agents acquires common knowledge of the for-
mula expressing that an email was sent. This shows how we can use our frame-
work to investigate epistemic consequences of email exchanges.
Given a set of emails E and a group of agents A, let
EA := {mB ∈ E | A⊆ S(m) ∪R(m) or ∃j ∈ B : (A⊆ S(m) ∪ {j})}.
When e ∈ EA we shall say that the email e is shared by the group A.
Note that when |A| ≥ 3, then e ∈ EA iff A⊆ S(m)∪R(m). When |A| = 2, then
e ∈ EA also when ∃j ∈ B : A = S(m)∪{j}, and when |A| = 1, then e ∈ EA also
when A = S(m) or ∃j ∈ B : A = {j}.
The following theorem summarizes our results.
Main Theorem Consider a legal state s = (E,L) and a group of agents A.
(i) s |= CAm iff there is m
′
B′ ∈ EA such that m
′ → m is valid.
(ii) Suppose that |A| ≥ 3. Then s |= CAmB iff the following hold:
C1 Ag = S(m) ∪R(m) ∪B,
C2 for each i ∈ B there is m′B′ ∈ EA such that m
′ → i J m is valid,
C3 there is m′B′ ∈ EA such that m
′ → m is valid.
In words, s |= CAmB iff
– the email mB involves all agents,
– there is an email shared by the group A that proves the existence of the
message m,
– for every agent i that is on the BCC list of mB there is an email shared by
the group A that proves that i forwarded message m.
As an aside let us mention that there is a corresponding result for the case
when |A| < 3, as well. However, it involves a tedious case analysis concerning
the relation between A,S(m), R(m) and B, so we do not present it here.
5 Proof of the Main Theorem
We establish first a number of auxiliary lemmas. We shall use a new strict partial
ordering on emails. We define
mB < m
′
B′ iff m 6= m
′ and m′ → m.
Note that m′ → m precisely if m′ is a forward, or a forward of a forward, etc,
of m. Then for two emails mB and mB′ from a legal state s with the causality
ordering ≺, mB < mB′ implies mB ≺ mB′ on the account of condition L.1.
However, the converse does not need to hold since mB ≺ mB′ can hold on
the account of L.2 or L.3. Further, note that the <-maximal elements of E are
precisely the emails in E that are not forwarded.
Given a set of emails E and E′ ⊆ E we then define the downward closure
of E′ by
E′≤ := E
′ ∪ {e ∈ E | ∃e′ ∈ E′ : e < e′}.
The set of emails E on which the downward closure of E′ depends will always
be clear from the context.
Next, we introduce two operations on states. Assume a state (E,L) and an
email mB ∈ E.
We define the state
s \mB := (E \ {mB}, L
′),
with
L′i :=
{
Li ∪ FI(m) if i ∈ R(m) ∪B
Li otherwise
Intuitively, s \mB is the result of removing the email mB from the state s,
followed by augmenting the sets of notes of its recipients in such a way that they
initially already had the knowledge they would have acquired from mB. Note
that s \mB is a legal state if mB is an <-maximal element of E.
Next, given C ⊆B we define the state
s[mB 7→C ] := (E \ {mB} ∪ {mC}, L
′),
with
L′i :=
{
Li ∪ FI(m) if i ∈ B \ C
Li otherwise
Intuitively, s[mB 7→C ] is the result of shrinking the set of BCC recipients of
m from B to C, followed by an appropriate augmenting of the sets of notes of
the agents that no longer receive m.
Note that s[mB 7→C ] is a legal state if there is no forward of m by an agent
i ∈ B \C, i.e., no email of the form f(i, l.m,G)D exists in E such that i ∈ B \C.
We shall need the following lemma that clarifies the importance of the set
EA of emails.
Lemma 2. Consider a legal state s = (E,L) and a group of agents A. Then for
some L′ the state s′ := ((EA)≤, L
′) is legal and s ∼A s′.
Proof. We prove that for all <-maximal emails mB ∈ E such that mB 6∈ EA (so
neither A⊆ S(m) ∪R(m) nor ∃i ∈ B : (A⊆ S(m) ∪ {i})) we have s ∼A s \mB.
Iterating this process we get the desired conclusion.
Suppose mB is a <-maximal email in E such that mB 6∈ EA. Take some
j ∈ A \ (S(m) ∪R(m)). Suppose first j 6∈ B. Then s ∼j s \mB so s ∼A s \mB.
Suppose now j ∈ B. Define
s1 := s[mB 7→{j}].
Then s1 is a legal state and s ∼j s1. Next, define
s2 := s[mB 7→∅].
Now take some k ∈ A \ (S(m) ∪ {j}). Then s1 ∼k s2 ∼j s \mB so s ∼A s \mB.
Note that both s1 and s2 are legal states since mB is <-maximal. 
Using the above lemma we now establish two auxiliary results concerning
common knowledge of the formula i J m or of its negation.
Lemma 3.
(i) s |= CAi J m iff ∃m′B ∈ EA : (m
′ → i J m)
or (A⊆ S(m) ∪ {i} and ∃mB ∈ EA : (i ∈ B)).
(ii) s |= CA¬i J m iff s |= ¬ i J m and (A⊆ S(m) ∪ {i} or s |= CA¬m).
To illustrate various alternatives listed in (i) note that each of the following
emails in E ensures that s |= C{j}i J m, where in each case m is the corre-
sponding send message:
s(i, l, G){j}, f(k, q.s(i, l, G), H){j},
s(k, l, i){j}, f(i, q.s(k, l, G), H){j}, s(j, l, G){i}.
The first four of these emails imply s |= C{j}i J m by the first clause of (i), the
last one by the second clause.
Proof. (i) (⇒ ) Suppose s |= CAi J m. Take the legal state s′ constructed in
Lemma 2. Then s ∼A s′, so s′ |= i J m.
Hence for some group B we have mB ∈ (EA)≤ and i ∈ S(m) ∪ R(m) ∪ B.
Three cases arise.
Case 1. i ∈ S(m) ∪R(m).
Then m → i J m. So if mB ∈ EA, then the claim holds. Otherwise some
email m′B′ ∈ EA exists such that mB < m
′
B′ . Consequently m
′ → m and hence
m′ → i J m. So the claim holds as well.
Case 2. i 6∈ S(m) ∪R(m) and A⊆ S(m) ∪ {i}.
Then i ∈ B since i ∈ S(m) ∪ R(m) ∪ B. Then by the definition of EA,
mB ∈ EA so the claim holds.
Case 3. i 6∈ S(m) ∪R(m) and ¬(A⊆ S(m) ∪ {i}).
If for some note l and groups G and C we have f(i, l.m,G)C ∈ (EA)≤, then
either f(i, l.m,G)C ∈ EA or for some m′B′ ∈ EA we have f(i, l.m,G)C < m
′
B′ .
In the former case we use the fact that the implication f(i, l.m,G) → i J m is
valid. In the latter case m′ → f(i, l.m,G) and hence m′ → i J m. So in both
cases the claim holds.
Otherwise let s′′ = s′[mB 7→B\{i}]. Note that s
′′ is a legal state because i does
not forward m in s′. Take some j ∈ A \ (S(m)∪{i}). Then s′ ∼j s′′, so s ∼A s′′.
Moreover, s′′ |= ¬i J m, which yields a contradiction. So this case cannot arise.
(⇐ ) The claim follows directly by the definition of semantics. We provide a
proof for one representative case. Suppose that for some email m′B ∈ EA both
A⊆ S(m′)∪R(m′) and m′ → i J m. Take some legal state s′ such that s ∼A s′.
Then for some group B′ we have m′B′ ∈ Es′ . So s
′ |= m′ and hence s′ |= i J m.
Consequently s |= CAi J m.
(ii) Let s = (E,L).
(⇒ ) Suppose s |= CA¬i J m. Then s |= ¬i J m. Assume A 6⊆ S(m) ∪ {i} and
s 6|= CA¬m. Then there is some legal state s′ = (E′, L′) such that s ∼A s′ and
s′ |= m. Then there is some group B such thatmB ∈ E′. Let j ∈ A\(S(m)∪{i})
and let s′′ = (E′ \ {mB} ∪ {mB∪{i}}, L
′). Then s′ ∼j s′′ so s ∼A s′′. But
s′′ |= i J m which contradicts our assumption.
(⇐ ) Suppose that s |= ¬i J m and either A⊆ S(m) ∪ {i} or s |= CA¬m. We
first consider the case that A⊆ S(m) ∪ {i}. Let s′ be any legal state such that
s ∼A s′. Assume s′ |= i J m. Then mB ∈ Es′ for some group B such that i ∈ B.
Since A⊆ S(m) ∪ {i}, any legal state s′′ such that s′ ∼A s′′ contains an email
mC ∈ Es′′ for some group C such that i ∈ C. So s′′ |= i J m. In particular, this
holds for the state s, which contradicts our assumption. So s′ |= ¬s(i, n,G) and
hence s |= CA¬s(i, n,G).
Now we consider the case that s |= CA¬m. Let s′ be such that s ∼A s′. Then
s′ |= ¬m. Since i J m→ m is valid, we get s′ |= ¬i J m. So s |= CA¬i J m. 
We are now ready to prove the Main Theorem.
Proof
(i) (⇒ ) Suppose s |= CAm. Take the legal state s′ constructed in Lemma 2.
Then s ∼A s′, so s′ |= m. So for some group B we have mB ∈ (EA)≤.
Hence either mB ∈ EA or some email m′B′ ∈ EA exists such that mB < m
′
B′ .
In both cases the claim holds.
(⇐ ) Suppose that for some email m′B ∈ EA we have m
′ → m. Take some
legal state s′ such that s ∼A s′. Then by the form of EA and the definition of
semantics for some group B′ we have m′B′ ∈ Es′ . So s
′ |= m′ and hence s′ |= m.
Consequently s |= CAm.
(ii) By the definition of mB, the fact that the CA operator distributes over the
conjunction, part (i) of the Main Theorem and Lemma 3 we have
s |= CAmB iff C3-C6,
where
C4
∧
i∈S(m)∪R(m)∪B ((A ⊆ S(m) ∪ {i} and ∃B
′ : (mB′ ∈ EA and i ∈ B′)) or
∃m′B′ ∈ EA : (m
′ → i J m)),
C5
∧
i6∈S(m)∪R(m)∪B (A⊆ S(m) ∪ {i} or s |= CA¬m),
C6 s |=
∧
i6∈S(m)∪R(m)∪B ¬i J m.
(⇒ ) Suppose s |= CAmB. Then properties C3-C6 hold. But |A| ≥ 3 and
s |= CAm imply that no conjunct of C5 holds. Hence property C1 holds.
Further, since |A| ≥ 3 the first disjunct of each conjunct in C4 does not hold.
So the second disjunct of each conjunct in C4 holds, which implies property C2.
(⇐ ) Suppose properties C1-C3 hold. It suffices to establish properties C4-C6.
For i ∈ S(m) ∪ R(m) we have m → i J m. So C2 implies property C4.
Further, since C1 holds, properties C5 and C6 hold vacuously. 
6 Analysis of BCC
In our framework we built emails out of messages using the BCC feature. So it
is natural to analyze whether and in what sense the emails can be reduced to
messages without BCC recipients.
Given a send email s(i, l, G)B, where B = {j1, . . ., jk}, we can simulate it by
the following sequence of messages:
s(i, l, G), f(i, s(i, l, G), j1), . . ., f(i, s(i, l, G), jk).
Analogous simulation can be formed for the forward email f(i, l.m,G)B.
In what follows we clarify in what sense this simulation is correct. Below,
given a message m we write f(S(m),m, j) for f(i,m, {j}), where S(m) = {i}.
Definition 1. Given a state s = (E,L) such that there is no forward of the
message m by the agent j in E, we define remmj (s) as follows:
– if mB ∈ E for some group B and j ∈ B and f(S(m),m, j)C 6∈ E for any
group C then
remmj (s) := (E\mB ∪ {mB\{j}, f(S(m),m, j)∅}, L),
– if mB ∈ E for some group B and j ∈ B and f(S(m),m, j)C ∈ E for some
group C then
remmj (s) := (E\mB ∪ {mB\{j}}, L),
– otherwise remmj (s) := s.
So, assuming mB ∈ s and j ∈ B, we form remmj (s) by replacing the email
mB by mB\{j} when for some group C the forward f(S(m),m, j)C is present in
E, or by mB\{j}, f(S(m),m, j)∅ when no such forward is present in E.
We assume that in E there is no forward of m by agent j, as otherwise the
removal of j from the list of the BCC recipients would yield an illegal state.
Indeed, for such a forward of the message m condition L.1 would not hold. In
the remainder of this section we assume that such forwards by former BCC
recipients are not present.
We are currently working on a formal analysis of a simulation of BCC that
does allow such forwards. It is obtained by replacing each such forward f(j,m,G)
by f(j, f(i,m, j), G).
We now show that using the above operation remmj (s) we obtain a legal
state that is almost equivalent to the original one. We establish first two lemmas
concerning the relation between remmj (s) and the knowledge relation of some
agent k.
Lemma 4. For any two legal states s and t, message m and agent j, if s ∼k t
then remmj (s) ∼k rem
m
k (t).
Proof. Omitted for the reasons of space. 
Lemma 5. For any legal state s, message m and agent j, if there is some t′
such that remmj (s) ∼k t
′ then either s ∼k rem
m
j (s) or there is some t such that
s ∼k t and t′ = remmj (t).
Proof. Let s′ = remmj (s) and suppose s
′ ∼k t′. If s = s′ then s ∼k s′. Suppose
otherwise. Then by the definition of remmj (s) we know that there is some group
B such that j ∈ B, mB ∈ Es and mB\{j} ∈ Es′ . Define B
′ = B\{j}.
Suppose there is no full version of f(S(m),m, j) in Et′ . By the definition of
remmj (s), there is a full version of f(S(m),m, j) in Es′ so then we know that
k 6∈ S(m) ∪ {j} because s′ ∼k t′. Clearly then s ∼k s′.
Suppose there is a full version of f(S(m),m, j) in Et′ . Then there is some
group C such that mC ∈ Et′ . Suppose j ∈ C. Since mB′ ∈ Es′ , j 6∈ B′ and
s′ ∼k t′ this means k 6∈ S(m) ∪ {j}. So s ∼k s′.
Finally, suppose that mC ∈ Et′ , j 6∈ C and f(S(m),m, j)C′ ∈ Et′ . Suppose
there is no full version of f(S(m),m, j) in Es. Define t as the state which is like
t′ but with Et = Et′\{mC, f(S(m),m, j)C′} ∪ {mC∪{j}}. Clearly, rem
m
j (t) = t
′.
We claim s ∼k t. The condition on the notes is satisfied since the sets of notes
in s and s′ and in t and t′ are identical, and s′ ∼k t′. We will to show that for
any m′D ∈ Es such that k ∈ S(m
′) ∪ R(m′) ∪ D there is some m′D′ ∈ Et such
that m′D ∼k m
′
D′ . The proof in the other direction is very similar. Take such an
m′D.
Suppose m′D = mB. We know mB′ ∈ Es′ so mB′ ∼k mC . Since B = B
′ ∪{j}
then clearly mB ∼k mC∪{j} and we know mC∪{j} ∈ Et so let m
′
D′ = mC∪{j}.
Suppose otherwise. Then m′D ∈ Es′ so there is m
′
D′ ∈ Et′ such that m
′
D ∼k
m′D′ . We know that m
′ 6= m and m′ 6= f(S(m),m, j) because no full version of
f(S(m),m, j)) is in Es so then m
′
D′ ∈ Et.
Finally, suppose that for some group E, f(S(m),m, j)E ∈ Es. Let Et =
Et′\{mC} ∪ {mC∪{j}}. The proof is very similar.
For the case that m′D = f(S(m),m, j)E , note that f(S(m),m, j)E ∈ Es′ so
f(S(m),m, j)E ∼k f(S(m),m, j)C′ , so let m′D′ = f(S(m),m, j)C′ . 
The theorem below shows that our operation of removing a BCC recipient
results in a state that is equivalent for all formulas that do not explicitly mention
the newly added forward or the fact that this BCC recipient received the original
message.
Theorem 1. For any state s, message m, agent j and formula ϕ that does not
mention j J m or f(i,m, j), s |= ϕ iff remmj (s) |= ϕ.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the structure of ϕ. The only interesting case
is when ϕ = CGψ.
Suppose remmj (s) |= CGψ. Let s ∼G t for some group of agents G. Then
there must be a path s ∼j1 s1 ∼j2 ... ∼jn t, with j1, ..., jn ∈ G. Then by Lemma
4, remmj (s) ∼j1 rem
m
j (s1) ∼j2 ... ∼jn rem
m
j (t). Hence rem
m
j (s) |= CGψ implies
that remmj (t) |= ψ. By the induction hypothesis, t |= ψ. So s |= CGψ.
Suppose s |= CGψ. If s ∼G remmj (s) then clearly rem
m
j (s) |= CGψ. Suppose
otherwise. Let remmj (s) ∼G t
′ for some state t′. Then there is a path remmj (s) =
s′0 ∼k1 s
′
1 ∼k2 ... ∼kn s
′
n = t
′, with k1, ..., kn ∈ G. We claim that for any s′i
there is a state si such that s ∼G si and remmj (si) = s
′
i. We will proceed by
induction. Clearly the claim holds for s′0 = rem
m
j (s). Suppose it holds for s
′
i−1,
so s ∼G si−1 and remmj (si−1) = s
′
i−1 for some state si−1. By Lemma 5 either
si−1 ∼ki s
′
i−1 or there is si such that si−1 ∼ki si and rem
m
j (si) = s
′
i. In the first
case, since s ∼G si−1 and ki ∈ G we have s ∼G s
′
i−1 and since rem
m
j (s) ∼G s
′
i−1
we have s ∼G remmj (s) which contradicts our assumption. In the second case,
s ∼G si so our claim holds. So then it also holds for s′n = t
′, and there is some t
such that s ∼G t and remmj (t) = t
′. But then by assumption t |= ψ and by the
induction hypothesis t′ |= ψ. So remmj (s) |= CGψ.
Clearly, by repeatedly applying above construction we obtain the simulation
of BCC given above. The corollary below shows that in the original and the
resulting state the status of the statement that there is common knowledge of
the underlying message is the same.
Definition 2. For a state s, a message m and a group of agents B = {j1, ..., jn}
such that mB ∈ Es, we define
remmB (s) := rem
m
j1
(remmj2(. . .rem
m
jn
(s))).
Corollary 1. For any legal state s, a group of agents A and an email mB ∈ Es
such that remmB (s) is a legal state
s |= CAm iff rem
m
B (s) |= CAm.
7 Conclusions and future work
Email is by now one of the most common forms of group communication. This
motivates the study here presented. The language we introduced allowed us
to discuss various fine points of email communication, notably forwarding and
the use of BCC. The epistemic semantics we proposed aimed at clarifying the
knowledge-theoretic consequences of this form of communication. Our presen-
tation focused on the issue of common knowledge aimed at clarifying when a
group of agents has a common knowledge of an email.
This framework also leads to natural questions concerning axiomatization of
the language and decidability of the semantics. Currently we work on
– a sound and complete axiomatization of the epistemic language L of Sec-
tion 3; at this stage we have such an axiomatization for the epistemic free
formulas,
– the problem of decidability of the truth definition given in Section 3; at this
stage we have a decidability result for positive formulas.
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